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Revision	of	the	Posted	Workers’	Directive:	Equality	at	Last?	
Dr	Rebecca	Zahn	
Introduction	
Recent	evidence	published	by	the	European	Commission	suggests	that	the	number	of	workers	who	
are	sent	from	one	Member	State	to	work	in	another	for	a	limited	period	of	time	–	‘posted’	workers	–	
has	increased	sharply.1	However,	posted	workers	often	earn	substantially	less	than	local	workers	for	
the	same	work	and	there	have	been	concerns	about	posted	workers	being	vulnerable	to	fraudulent	
activities	such	as	undeclared	work	practices.2	The	main	relevant	regulatory	framework	has	hitherto	
been	the	Posted	Workers’	Directive	(PWD)3	which	came	into	force	in	1996.	The	PWD	has	mixed	ob-
jectives	–	the	promotion	of	the	transnational	provision	of	services	within	a	climate	of	 fair	competi-
tion	while	also	guaranteeing	 respect	 for	 the	 rights	of	workers4	–	 the	balancing	of	which	has	 led	 to	
tensions	in	its	interpretation;	culminating	in	the	much-debated	decision	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	
European	Union	(CJEU)	in	Laval5	which	created	a	difficult	interface	between	the	free	movement	pro-
visions	contained	in	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	(TFEU)	and	national	labour	
law.	In	particular,	the	decision	had	the	effect	of	raising	questions	over	the	PWD’s	ability,	in	its	current	
form,	to	fulfil	its	objectives	of	‘guaranteeing	respect	for	the	rights	of	workers’	and	maintaining	‘a	cli-
mate	of	fair	competition’	between	local	and	posted	workers	while	also	promoting	‘the	transnational	
provision	of	services’.	As	part	of	its	Work	Programme	2016	and	in	recognition	of	ongoing	tensions	in	
the	area	of	posted	work,	 the	European	Commission	published	a	proposal	 for	a	Directive	amending	
the	PWD	on	8	March	2016.6	This	paper	first	contextualises	the	phenomenon	of	posted	work	in	the	EU	
and	then	briefly	outlines	the	current	legal	framework	governing	posted	work.	A	subsequent	section	
discusses	the	extent	to	which	the	PWD	fulfils	 its	objective	of	guaranteeing	‘respect	for	the	rights	of	
workers’	and	identifies	remaining	gaps	in	protection.	A	final	section	assesses	the	Commission’s	most	
recent	proposal.	
The	phenomenon	of	posted	work	
Recent	evidence	produced	by	the	European	Commission	indicates	that	between	2010	and	2014,	the	
number	of	workers	posted	from	one	EU	State	to	another	increased	by	almost	49%	to	a	total	of	ap-
proximately	1.9	million	workers.7	86%	of	workers	are	posted	to	the	EU-15	Member	States	with	Ger-
many,	 France	and	Belgium	 receiving	 the	 largest	 share.	Poland,	Germany	and	France	accounted	 for	
																																								 																				
1	See	further	European	Commission,	Impact	Assessment	accompanying	the	document	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	Eu-
ropean	Parliament	and	the	Council	amending	Directive	96/71/EC	concerning	the	posting	of	workers	in	the	framework	of	
the	provision	of	services	SWD(2016)	53	final.	
2	Ibid.	
3	Directive	96/71/EC	concerning	the	posting	of	workers	in	the	framework	of	the	provision	of	services.	
4	Recital	5	of	the	Preamble	to	the	Directive.	
5	Case	C-341/05	Laval	un	Partneri	Ltd	v.	Svenska	Byggnadsarbetareförbundet,	Svenska	Byggnadsarbetareförbundets	avd.	
1,	Byggettan,	Svenska	Elektrikerförbundet	[2007]	ECR	I-11767.	
6	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-466_en.htm.		
7	The	statistics	in	this	paragraph	are	drawn	from	European	Commission,	Impact	Assessment,	pp.	6-8.	
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the	three	largest	senders	of	posted	workers	in	2014.	Postings	involve	0.7%	of	the	total	EU	workforce	
although	there	are	wide	variations	 in	different	sectors.	42%	of	total	postings	occur	 in	the	construc-
tion	 sector	 but	 posting	of	workers	 is	 also	 important	 in	 the	manufacturing	 industry	 (21.8%),	 and	 in	
other	service	sectors	such	as	personal	services	(education,	health	and	social	work,	13.5%)	and	busi-
ness	services	(administrative,	professional,	and	financial	services,	10.3%).	It	has	been	estimated	that	
the	vast	majority	of	posted	workers	are	male.8	 It	should	be	noted	however	that	these	statistics	are	
far	 from	perfect.	 The	 European	Commission	uses	 information	provided	by	 administrative	 forms	 is-
sued	by	the	authority	of	the	posted	workers’	country	of	origin.	But	significant	gaps	arise	between	na-
tional	and	EU	figures	and	there	is	a	lack	of	precise	data	on	the	duration	of	posting,	the	feminisation	
rate	of	posted	work,	the	qualifications	of	the	workers	and	their	earnings.9		
The	regulatory	framework	
The	main	 legislation	 governing	 posted	work	within	 the	 EU	 is	 the	 PWD.	 It	 aims	 to	 establish	 a	 legal	
framework	of	minimum	labour	rights	which	regulates	the	working	conditions	of	workers	sent	tempo-
rarily	to	work	in	another	Member	State.	As	such,	the	PWD	provides	posted	workers	with	certain	min-
imum	rights	but,	 in	the	 interests	of	cross-border	competition,	 it	does	not	shield	host	state	workers	
from	having	to	compete	with	cheaper	foreign	labour.	The	PWD	was	first	proposed	in	1991	when	the	
European	Commission	sought	to	regulate	the	provision	of	services	in	an	attempt	to	find	a	balance	be-
tween	workers’	rights	and	the	free	provision	of	services.10	This	followed	the	decision	by	the	CJEU	in	
Rush	Portuguesa11	where	the	Court	held	that	Community	law	does	not	preclude	host	Member	States	
from	extending	their	legislation,	or	collective	labour	agreements	entered	into	by	both	sides	of	indus-
try,	 to	 any	 person	 who	 is	 employed,	 even	 temporarily,	 within	 their	 territory,	 no	matter	 in	 which	
country	the	employer	is	established.	The	decision	in	Rush	Portugesa	concerned	Portuguese	workers	
working	for	a	Portuguese	entrepreneur	in	France.	Due	to	the	Accession	Act,	the	Portuguese	workers	
did	not	benefit	 from	the	 free	movement	of	workers	at	 the	time	however	 the	Court	 found	that	 the	
employer,	as	a	service	provider,	was	entitled	to	make	use	of	his	rights	under	the	Treaty	‘with	all	his	
staff’12.	France	was	given	permission	to	extend	its	domestic	labour	laws	to	posted	workers	although	
posted	workers	were	not	given	a	 right	 to	equal	 treatment	with	employees	of	host	State	establish-
ments.	In	effect,	the	Court	clarified	that	national	treatment	by	the	host	State,	as	far	as	labour	stand-
ards	were	concerned,	did	not	amount	to	 indirect	discrimination	against	home	State	service	provid-
																																								 																				
8	 See	 Eurofund,	 Posted	 Workers	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 available	 at	
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/posted-workers-in-the-european-
union		
9	See	C.	Dhéret	and	A.	Ghimis,	‘The	revision	of	the	Posted	Workers	Directive:	towards	a	sufficient	policy	adjustment?’	Eu-
ropean	Policy	Centre	Discussion	Paper,	20	April	2016,	p.	4.		
10	J.	Cremers,	J.E.	Dølvik	&	G.	Bosch,	‘Posting	of	workers	in	the	single	market:	attempts	to	prevent	social	dumping	and	
regime	competition	in	the	EU’	(2007)	Industrial	Relations	Journal	524,	p.	526.	
11	Case	C-113/89,	Rush	Portuguesa	 Lda	v.	Office	 national	 d’immigration	 [1990]	 ECR	 I-1417.	 The	decision	 in	Rush	Por-
tugesa	is	widely	regarded	as	instrumental	in	the	adoption	of	the	PWD.	See,	e.g.,	J.	Dølvik	and	J.	Visser,	‘Free	movement,	
equal	treatment	and	workers’	rights:	can	the	European	Union	solve	its	trilemma	of	fundamental	principles?’	(2009)	40	in-
dustrial	Relations	Journal	491.	However,	Evju	traces	a	much	longer	and	more	complex	background	to	the	Directive	in	S.	
Evju,	‘Revisiting	the	Posted	Workers	Directive:	Conflict	of	Laws	and	Laws	in	Contrast’	(2009-2010)	12	CYELS	151.		
12	Para	12.	
CETLS	ONLINE	PAPER	SERIES,	VOLUME	5	(1)		 2016	
	
-	3	-	
ers.13	At	the	same	time,	the	Court	firmly	placed	the	regulation	of	posted	work	within	the	scope	of	the	
freedom	to	provide	services	rather	than	the	free	movement	of	workers.		
In	the	wake	of	the	CJEU’s	decision	and	after	extensive	consultations	with	Member	States	and	the	so-
cial	partners14,	the	Commission	proposed	a	directive	in	1991	to	regulate	the	cross-border	temporary	
provision	of	services	in	order	to	create	legal	certainty	for	the	employer.	The	proposal	met	with	oppo-
sition	from	Member	States	and	the	European	Parliament,	and	an	amended	proposal	was	put	forward	
in	1993	which,	 following	a	number	of	 revisions,	was	adopted	 in	1996.	 15	 The	 legal	base	 for	 the	Di-
rective	can	be	found	in	articles	53	and	62	TFEU	on	the	provision	of	services	and	the	right	to	estab-
lishment,	rather	than	in	the	social	policy	provisions.	Thus,	although	the	PWD	was	adopted	in	order	to	
protect	workers’	rights,	the	primary	aim	of	the	Directive	is	to	facilitate	the	cross-border	provision	of	
services.16		
The	Directive	 identifies	minimum	standards	of	core	working	conditions	 in	article	3(1)	which	should	
apply	equally	to	national	and	posted	workers	 in	order	to	fulfil	 the	PWD’s	objective	of	guaranteeing	
respect	for	the	rights	of	workers.	These	include	working	time	and	annual	holidays,	minimum	rates	of	
pay,	the	regulation	of	temporary	work,	health	and	safety,	measures	which	aim	to	protect	pregnant	
women	and	young	people,	and	equality	of	treatment	between	men	and	women.	The	concept	of	min-
imum	rates	of	pay	is	defined	by	the	national	law	and/or	practice	of	the	Member	State	to	whose	terri-
tory	the	worker	is	posted.	Minimum	rates	of	pay	must	be	laid	down	by	law,	regulation	or	administra-
tive	 provision,	 and/or	 by	 collective	 agreements	which	 have	 been	 declared	 universally	 applicable.17	
Those	moving	as	posted	workers	cannot	claim	a	general	right	to	equal	treatment	with	national	work-
ers	on	the	basis	of	EU	law.	As	such,	the	term	‘worker’	is	a	misnomer	here	and	posted	workers’	rights	
as	‘workers’	(under	article	45	TFEU)	are	suspended	during	the	period	of	posting.		
Member	States	are	thus	permitted,	in	principle,	to	apply	their	own	labour	legislation	to	employees	of	
a	company	providing	temporary	services.	It	should	be	noted	though	that	all	of	the	conditions	listed	in	
article	3(1)	of	the	PWD,	apart	from	minimum	rates	of	pay18,	are	the	subject	of	harmonising	EU	legis-
lation.	It	is	therefore	not	surprising	that	controversies	over	interpretation	persist	in	the	area	of	mini-
mum	rates	of	pay	although	the	Court	has	carefully	scrutinised	any	claims	by	Member	States	that	leg-
																																								 																				
13	P.	Davies,	‘Posted	Workers:	Single	Market	or	Protection	of	National	Labour	Law	Systems?’	(1997)	3	Common	Market	
Law	Review	571.	
14	See	COM(91)	230	final	and	Evju,	‘Revisiting	the	Posted	Workers	Directive’.	
15	See	Evju,	‘Revisiting	the	Posted	Workers	Directive,	p.	166.	Of	particular	concern	were	provisions	on	the	way	in	which	a	
host	country’s	labour	laws	were	to	be	laid	down.	Denmark	and	Italy	also	tabled	amendments	to	make	provision	for	the	
regulation	of	posted	workers’	rights	by	collective	agreements	of	‘general	applicability’	and	by	those	agreements	conclud-
ed	by	the	most	representative	organisations.		
16	Ibid.,	572–573.	See	also	Evju,	‘Revisiting	the	Posted	Workers	Directive’,	p.	169.	
17	See	further	article	3(8).	
18	Directive	2008/104/EC	on	temporary	agency	work	[2008]	OJ	L327/9	lays	down,	 in	article	5(1),	the	principle	of	equal	
treatment	between	agency	workers	and	workers	directly	employed	by	the	user	undertaking,	 in	respect	of	a	number	of	
‘basic	working	and	employment	conditions’.	However,	the	flexibility	inherent	in	the	Directive	which	as	arguably	necessary	
in	order	to	secure	its	adoption	means	that	‘the	resulting	instrument	effectively	secures	only	minimal	rights	and	protec-
tions	for	agency	workers’	and	issues	over	the	protection	of	agency	work	and	posted	work	continue	to	arise.	See	further	
N.	Countouris	and	R.	Horton,	 ‘The	Temporary	Agency	Work	Directive:	another	broken	promise?’	(2009)	38(3)	 Industrial	
Law	Journal	329.	
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islative	restrictions	operate	for	the	protection	of	posted	workers.19	As	was	noted	by	the	EFTA	Court,	
the	aim	of	the	PWD	is	clearly	to	protect	services	rather	than	workers.20		
Nonetheless,	this	system	of	regulation	did	not	prove	to	be	particularly	problematic	prior	to	the	Euro-
pean	enlargements	in	2004	and	2007	even	though	critics	writing	at	the	time	of	the	adoption	of	the	
Directive	 questioned	 how	 the	 Court	 would	 interpret	 its	 provisions.21	 Following	 the	 European	 en-
largements	in	2004	and	2007,	and	the	increased	number	of	posted	workers	sent	from	‘new’	to	‘old’	
Member	States,	the	PWD	fell	far	short	of	its	goal	of	guaranteeing	certain	labour	conditions	to	posted	
workers.	The	CJEU	was	finally	asked	to	give	a	ruling	on	the	Directive	in	the	Laval	case22.	In	Laval,	the	
capacity	for	minimum	wages	(and	other	work	related	benefits)	to	be	set	for	posted	workers	by	col-
lective	bargaining	by	trade	unions	in	the	host	State	was	cast	into	doubt.	The	main	focus	of	the	CJEU’s	
judgment	was	whether	the	collective	action	in	the	form	of	a	blockade	taken	by	trade	unions	in	this	
case	was	compatible	with	the	EU	rules	on	the	freedom	to	provide	services	(article	56	TFEU).	One	as-
pect	that	the	Court	discussed	at	length	was	the	characteristic	of	the	host	country	that	the	legislation	
to	implement	the	PWD	had	no	express	provision	concerning	the	application	of	terms	and	conditions	
of	employment	in	collective	agreements.	The	relevant	collective	agreement	in	this	case	provided	for	
more	 favourable	 conditions	 than	 those	 envisaged	 by	 the	 PWD.	 The	 Court,	 therefore,	 considered	
whether	the	collective	action	taken	was	justifiable	in	light	of	its	objective,	namely,	to	force	a	service	
provider	to	grant	more	favourable	conditions	to	its	workers	than	those	prescribed	by	EU	law.		
In	response	the	Court,	first,	reiterated	its	settled	case	law	on	the	free	movement	of	services	which	al-
lows	a	Member	State	to	apply	its	legislation	or	collective	agreements	to	a	service	provider	as	long	as	
the	application	of	these	rules	is	appropriate	for	securing	the	protection	of	workers	and	does	not	go	
beyond	what	 is	necessary	 for	 the	attainment	of	 the	objective.23	Against	 this	background,	 the	PWD	
therefore	lays	down	a	level	of	minimum	protection	the	exact	content	of	which	may	be	defined	by	the	
individual	Member	States.24	However,	the	Court	did	not	accept	the	method	of	implementation	of	the	
PWD	in	Sweden	where	the	applicable	rates	of	pay	were	negotiated	on	a	case	by	case	basis	through	
the	social	partners	without	being	supplemented	by	legislation	providing	for	universal	applicability:	it	
concluded	that	this	leads	to	a	climate	of	unfair	competition	as	between	national	and	posted	service	
																																								 																				
19	See,	for	example,	Joined	Cases	C-49,	50,	52,	54,	68	and	71/98	Finalarte	Sociedade	de	Construçâo	Civil	Lda	[2001]	ECR	I-
7831	and	Joined	Cases	C-369	and	376/96	Criminal	Proceedings	against	Jean-Claude	Arblade	and	Arblade	&	Fils	SARL	and	
against	Bernard	Leloup	and	others	[1999]	ECR	I-8453.	
20	Case	E-3/12	Norway	v	Jonsson	[2013]	OJ	277/9,	[58].	
21	P.	Davies,	 ‘Posted	Workers:	 Single	Market	or	Protection	of	National	 Labour	 Law	Systems?’	 (1997)	Common	Market	
Law	Review	571.	The	CJEU	was	not	asked	to	rule	on	many	of	the	key	aspects	of	the	Directive	prior	to	2007.	Most	cases	
were	decided	before	the	deadline	for	the	implementation	of	the	Directive	had	passed.		
22	There	is	a	vast	amount	of	literature	on	the	case	and	its	aftermath.	For	a	small	selection	of	literature	see	the	website	of	
the	 European	 Trade	 Union	 Institute	 (http://www.etui.org/Topics/Social-dialogue-collective-bargaining/Social-
legislation/The-interpretation-by-the-European-Court-of-Justice/Reaction-to-the-judgements/Articles-in-academic-
literature-on-the-judgements).	Laval	forms	part	of	a	‘Quartet’	of	cases	decided	at	a	similar	time	which	included	Case	C-
438/05,	The	International	Transport	Workers’	Federation	and	The	Finnish	Seamen’s	Union	v.	Viking	Line	ABP	and	OÜ	Vi-
king	Line	Eesti	ECR	 [2007]	 I-10779;	Case	C-346/06,	Dirk	Rüffert,	 in	his	capacity	as	 liquidator	of	the	assets	of	Objekt	und	
Bauregie	 GmbH	&	 Co.	 KG	 v.	 Land	 Niedersachsen	 [2008]	 ECR	 I-1989	 and	Case	 C-319/06,	 Commission	 of	 the	 European	
Communities	v.	Grand	Duchy	of	Luxemburg	[2008]	ECR	I-04323.	
23	Para	56.	
24	Paras	58-60.	
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providers.25	Furthermore,	the	Court	pointed	out	that	the	PWD	does	not	allow	the	host	Member	State	
to	make	the	provision	of	services	 in	 its	territory	conditional	on	the	observance	of	terms	and	condi-
tions	of	employment	which	go	beyond	the	mandatory	rules	for	minimum	protection.26		
The	judgment	has	been	heavily	criticised	for	its	potential	to	limit	trade	unions’	rights	to	take	collec-
tive	action	and	for	its	failure	to	take	into	account	the	successful	and	flexible	system	of	collective	bar-
gaining	 prevalent	 in	 Sweden.27	 It	 also	 ‘effectively	 settled’28	 any	 doubts	 over	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 the	
PWD’s	objectives	with	the	economic	arguments	clearly	taking	precedence	over	concerns	for	the	pro-
tection	of	workers’	rights.	
Following	the	judgment,	the	European	social	partners	were	invited	by	the	European	Commission	to	
respond	to	the	consequences	of	the	CJEU’s	case	law.	A	joint	report	was	issued	in	2010.29	In	addition,	
the	ETUC	argued	for	a	revision	of	the	PWD	and	for	a	Social	Progress	Protocol30	to	be	attached	to	the	
EU	Treaties.31	The	European	Parliament	in	2008	called	for	changes	to	be	made	to	the	PWD	in	order	to	
improve	 its	correct	application	and	enforcement.	 In	2010,	 the	European	Economic	and	Social	Com-
mittee	argued	in	favour	of	the	PWD’s	revision	in	order	to	improve	its	 implementation.	 In	2012,	the	
Commission	issued	proposals	for	an	Enforcement	Directive32	and	a	Regulation33	(the	‘Monti	II	Regu-
lation’)	 to	 regulate	 the	 right	of	workers	 to	 take	 collective	action.	Although	 the	Monti	 II	Regulation	
failed	to	see	the	 light	of	day34,	 the	Enforcement	Directive	was	adopted	with	minor	amendments	 in	
May	2014.35	As	 its	name	suggests,	 the	Enforcement	Directive	aims	 inter	alia	 to	 raise	awareness	of	
																																								 																				
25	Paras	71	and	80-81.	
26	Para	80.	
27	There	is	a	substantial	amount	of	literature	discussing	the	judgments,	not	all	of	which	can	be	mentioned	in	this	section.	
For	different	views	on	the	judgments	see,	for	example,	M.	Freedland	and	J.	Prassl,	Viking,	Laval	and	Beyond,	Hart,	Oxford,	
2004;	M.	Rönmar	 (ed.),	EU	 Industrial	 Relations	 vs	National	 Industrial	 Relations.	 Comparative	 and	 Interdisciplinary	 Per-
spectives,	Kluwer,	Frederick,	MD,	2008;	R.	Blanpain	&	A.M.	Swiatkowski	 (eds.),	The	Laval	and	Viking	Cases:	 freedom	of	
services	and	establishment	v	industrial	conflict	in	the	European	Economic	Area	and	Russia,	Kluwer,	Frederick,	MD,	2009;	
and	articles	by	A.	Dashwood,	T.	Novitz,	M.	Rönmar,	S.	Deakin	and	S.	Sciarra	in	C.	Barnard	(ed.),	Cambridge	Yearbook	of	
European	Legal	Studies,	2007-2008,	Vol.	10,	Hart	Publishing,	Oxford.	
28	Evju,	‘Revisiting	the	Posted	Workers	Directive’,	p.	169.	
29	ETUC	et	al.,	Report	on	joint	work	of	the	European	social	partners	on	the	ECJ	rulings	in	the	Viking,	Laval,	Rüffert	and	
Luxembourg	 cases,	 19	 March	 2010,	 available	 at	
http://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/Joint_report_ECJ_rulings_FINAL_logos_19.03.10_1.pdf.		
30	The	idea	of	a	Social	Progress	Protocol	is	not	new.	For	an	overview	of	the	discussion	see	A.	Bücker,	‘A	comprehensive	
Social	Progress	Protocol	is	needed	more	than	ever’	(2013)	4	European	Labour	Law	Journal	4.	
31	 ETUC,	 ‘The	 Posting	 of	 Workers	 Directive:	 proposals	 for	 revision’,	 9-10	 March	 2010,	 available	 at	
http://www.etuc.org/documents/posting-workers-directive-proposals-revision#.VBwN8hb9mMk.			
32	European	Commission,	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	the	enforcement	of	
Directive	97/71/EC	concerning	the	posting	of	workers	in	the	framework	of	the	provision	of	services,	COM(2012)	131	final.	
33	European	Commission,	Proposal	for	a	Council	Regulation	on	the	exercise	of	the	right	to	take	collective	action	within	
the	context	of	the	freedom	of	establishment	and	the	freedom	to	provide	services,	COM(2012)	130	final.		
34	For	an	overview	of	the	difficulties	encountered	by	the	Regulation	see	The	Adoptive	Parents,	‘The	Life	of	a	Death	Fore-
told:	The	Proposal	 for	a	Monti	 II	Regulation’	 in	M.	Freedland	and	J.	Prassl,	Viking,	Laval	and	Beyond,	Hart,	2015	and	F.	
Fabbrini	and	K.	Granat,	‘”Yellow	Card	but	no	Foul”:	the	Role	of	the	National	Parliaments	under	the	Subsidiarity	Protocol	
and	the	Commission	Proposal	for	an	EU	Regulation	on	the	Right	to	Strike’	(2013)	50	Common	Market	Law	Review	115.	
35	Council	Directive	2014/67/EU	of	15	May	2014	on	 the	enforcement	of	Directive	96/71/EC	concerning	 the	posting	of	
workers	in	the	framework	of	the	provision	of	services,	OJ	2014	No.	L159,	28	May	2014.	Member	States	had	until	18	June	
2016	to	transpose	the	Directive.	For	an	analysis	of	the	Directive	see	J.	Cremers,	‘Economic	freedoms	and	labour	standards	
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workers	 and	 companies	 about	 their	 rights	 and	 obligations	 as	 regards	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	
employment;	improve	cooperation	between	national	authorities	in	charge	of	posting;	clarify	the	def-
inition	 of	 posting	 increasing	 legal	 certainty	 for	 posted	 workers	 and	 service	 providers;	 and	 define	
Member	States’	 responsibilities	 to	verify	compliance	with	 the	 rules	 laid	down	 in	 the	PWD.	The	En-
forcement	Directive	also	introduces	liability	for	subcontractors	in	the	construction	industry.	Although	
the	 Enforcement	 Directive	 attempts	 to	 address	 some	 of	 the	 issues	 surrounding	 effective	 enforce-
ment	of	the	PWD,	it	does	not	alleviate	many	of	the	concerns	raised	by	the	CJEU’s	judgments	in	Laval.	
The	European	Trade	Union	Confederation	(ETUC)	confirms	this	view	in	its	reaction	to	the	Directive:	
Measures	to	be	taken	by	member	states	to	combat	abuse	and	under-payment	of	posted	work-
ers	should	not	be	subject	to	free	market	rules.	The	current	text	does	not	guarantee	that.	Rules	
applying	to	posted	workers	falling	outside	the	scope	of	the	directive	are	not	clear	either.36	
 
In	particular,	 the	 Enforcement	Directive	does	not	 address	 inequality	of	 treatment	between	posted	
and	local	workers,	and	it	fails	to	introduce	an	EU-wide	monitoring	system	which	could	help	to	reduce	
problems	 of	 differential	 treatment	 across	 Member	 States.	 In	 addition,	 the	 Enforcement	 Directive	
does	little	to	tackle	problems	related	to	the	definition	of	pay	which	has	raised	particular	concerns.37	
In	its	subsequent	case	law	on	the	PWD,	the	CJEU	has	sought	inter	alia	to	clarify	the	notion	of	‘mini-
mum	rates	of	pay’.38	The	 facts	of	 the	case	 in	Sähköalojen	ammattiliitto	ry39	have	much	 in	common	
with	the	Laval	case40:	Polish	workers	posted	to	work	on	a	Finnish	construction	site	were	not	paid	the	
minimum	remuneration	due	to	them	under	the	relevant	Finnish	collective	agreement	and	assigned	
their	pay	claims	to	a	Finnish	trade	union.	However,	unlike	in	Laval,	the	relevant	collective	agreement	
was	generally	applicable.	It	provided	for	a	calculation	of	minimum	pay	which	included	inter	alia	holi-
day	allowance,	 compensation	 for	 travelling	 time	and	accommodation	 costs,	 and	a	daily	 allowance.	
The	dispute	at	issue	therefore	centred	on	the	definition	of	‘minimum	rates	of	pay’	under	article	3	of	
the	PWD41;	the	Finnish	 industrial	relations	system	as	such	was	not	subject	to	challenge.	 In	 its	 judg-
ment,	the	CJEU	clarified	that	a	host	Member	State	can	require	sending	companies	to	include	in	the	
payment	to	posted	workers	holiday	allowances,	daily	flat-rate	allowances	to	compensate	workers	for	
disadvantages	entailed	by	the	posting,	and	compensation	for	travelling	time,	on	equal	terms	as	local	
workers;	provided	these	constituent	elements	of	 the	minimum	wage	do	not	have	the	effect	of	 im-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
in	the	European	Union’	(2016)	22(2)	Transfer	149.	
36	 ETUC,	 ‘Provisional	 deal	 on	 posting	 of	 workers	 will	 not	 put	 an	 end	 to	 social	 dumping’,	 5	March	 2014,	 available	 at	
http://www.etuc.org/press/provisional-deal-posting-workers-will-not-put-end-social-dumping#.VBwW4xb9mMk.			
37	See	D.	Schiek	et	al,	EU	Social	and	Labour	Rights	and	EU	Internal	Market	Law:	Study	for	the	EMPL	Committee	(Brussels:	
European	Parliament,	2015),	p.	62	which	found	that	problems	relating	to	fair	working	conditions	for	posted	workers	were	
the	most	 prevalent.	 Respondents	 from	 trade	 unions	 and	 labour	 inspectorates	 from	 the	Member	 States	 analysed	 ex-
pressed	concern	that	posted	workers	were	paid	significantly	lower	wages	than	other	workers	in	the	host	States.		
38	 It	has	also	been	concerned	with	the	use	of	public	procurement	 legislation	to	enforce	 labour	standards.	See	Case	C-
549/13	Bundesdruckerei	v	Stadt	Dortmund,	judgment	of	18	September	2014	and	Case	C-115/14	Regio	Post	GmbH	&	Co.	
KG	v	Stadt	Landau	in	der	Pfalz,	judgment	of	17	November	2015.	
39	Case	C-396/13	Sähköalojen	ammattiliitto	ry	v	Elektrobudowa	Spólka	Akcyjna,	judgment	of	12	February	2015.	
40	See	paras	33,	34	and	67	of	Advocate	General	Wahl’s	Opinion	in	Case	C-396/13	Sähköalojen	ammattiliitto	ry.	
41	The	CJEU	was	also	asked	to	rule	on	the	division	of	competences	between	the	Finnish	and	Polish	trade	unions.	
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peding	 the	 freedom	 to	 provide	 services.42	 Moreover,	 the	 ruling	 acknowledged	 that	 if	 collective	
agreements	set	different	pay	levels	related	to	the	categorisation	of	employees	into	pay	groups,	these	
pay	levels	need	to	be	considered	as	valid	in	line	with	the	Directive,	provided	that	the	conditions	are	
universally	 binding	 and	 transparent.43	 However,	 the	 CJEU	 in	 this	 case	 permitted	 the	 exclusion	 of	
posted	workers	from	specific	allowances	relating	to	the	costs	of	accommodation	and	meal	vouchers,	
which	workers	in	the	host	state	received.44	Although	the	judgment	leaves	it		up	to	the	national	court	
to	determine	whether	certain	allowances	form	part	of	the	minimum	wage,	the	CJEU	also	reiterated	
the	principle	 that	posted	workers	are	only	entitled	 to	minimum	protection	and	not	 to	equal	 treat-
ment.45		
The	 continuing	 lack	 of	 a	 clear	 definition	 of	 ‘minimum	 rates	 of	 pay’	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 equal	
treatment	principle	in	the	PWD,	particularly	in	relation	to	pay,	have	led	to	widespread	criticism	of	the	
Directive	and	have	raised	concerns	over	the	extent	to	which	the	PWD,	in	its	current	form,	can	fulfil	its	
objective	of	promoting	 the	 transnational	provision	of	 services	while	also	providing	 for	a	 climate	of	
fair	 competition	 (for	 host	 State	workers)	and	protecting	 (posted)	workers’	 rights.	 The	next	 section	
therefore	discusses	these	remaining	gaps	 in	protection	and	identifies	a	number	of	unintended	con-
sequences	of	the	Directive,	namely	the	extent	to	which	it	 leads	to	discrimination	on	the	grounds	of	
skill	levels	and	gender.	
Remaining	gaps	in	the	protection	of	workers’	rights?	
The	PWD	covers	three	different	types	of	posting:	‘normal’	posting	(article	1(3)(a))	whereby	undertak-
ings	post	workers	to	another	Member	State	in	order	to	provide	services	in	that	State;	intra-corporate	
posting	 (article	1(3)(b));	 and,	posting	 through	 temporary	agencies	 (article	1(3)(c)).	 The	 first	 type	of	
posting	is	the	least	problematic	and	often	involves	highly-skilled,	highly-paid	workers.46	In	relation	to	
intra-corporate	posting,	the	picture	is	more	varied	and	there	have	been	some	reports	of	subsidiaries,	
particularly	 in	 labour-intensive	 sectors,	 being	 created	 in	order	 to	 circumvent	 labour	 standards	 and	
other	 obligations.47	 As	 Cremers	 argues,	 ‘the	 cost	 advantages	 of	 posting	 from	 a	 low	 social	 security	
country	 to	 a	 country	 with	 ‘normal’	 social	 security	 costs	 can	mount	 up	 to	 25-30%.	 Other	 cost	 ad-
vantages	 are	 obtained	 if	 posted	 workers	 are	 not	 properly	 paid	 according	 to	 the	 correct	
skill/qualification	level	so	that	such	workers	are	subject	to	minimum	pay	and	conditions,	 instead	of	
the	equivalents	paid	to	the	ordinary	workforce	in	the	host	State.’48	Most	issues	arise	however	in	the	
third	scenario	when	temporary	work	agencies	are	involved;	this	is	most	prevalent	in	the	construction	
sector	where	there	have	been	reports	of	agencies	established	purely	for	the	purpose	of	circumvent-
ing	the	application	of	labour	standards.49	 It	is	estimated	that	posting	of	workers	through	temporary	
																																								 																				
42	See	also	Case-522/12	Tevfik	Isbir	v	DB	Services	GmbH,	judgment	of	7	November	2013.	
43	Paras	42	and	44.	
44	The	reasoning	justifying	such	exclusions	based	itself	on	an	interpretation	of	article	3(7)	of	the	PWD.	
45	See	para	30.	
46	See	further	J.	Cremers,	In	search	of	cheap	labour	in	Europe:	Working	and	living	conditions	of	posted	workers,	CLR	Stud-
ies	6,	Brussels,	2011.	
47	Ibid,	p.	26.	
48	Ibid.	
49	Ibid.	A	high-profile	example	of	this	can	be	found	in	the	so-called	‘Irish	Ferries’	dispute	which	first	erupted	in	December	
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agencies	represents,	on	average,	5%	of	total	postings	in	the	EU,	albeit	with	significant	cross-country	
variations.50	
In	those	sectors	where	issues	with	posting	have	been	reported,	posted	workers	generally	earn	sub-
stantially	less	than	local	workers,	with	reports	of	income	of	less	than	50%	than	that	usually	paid	in	a	
given	place	for	the	same	job.51	This	results	 in	segmentation	of	the	 labour	market	which	the	PWD’s	
provisions	do	little	to	prevent.	Instead,	the	PWD’s	provisions	on	pay	create	inequality	between	post-
ed	and	local	workers	by	allowing	for	a	structural	differentiation	of	wage	rules.	This	structural	differ-
entiation	arises	directly	as	a	 result	of	 the	PWD’s	 imprecision	over	minimum	rates	of	pay.	First,	 the	
PWD	only	guarantees	that	posted	workers	will	be	paid	minimum	rates	of	pay	as	part	of	a	‘hard	core	
of	clearly	defined	protective	rules’52	while	in	the	host	Member	State.	Minimum	rates	of	pay	are	de-
fined	either	by	the	law	or	by	universally	applicable	collective	agreements.	In	the	absence	of	univer-
sally	applicable	collective	agreements,	Member	States	may	decide	to	base	themselves	on	collective	
agreements	which	are	generally	applicable	to	all	similar	undertakings	in	the	geographical	area	and	in	
the	profession	or	 industry	 concerned,	or	 collective	agreements	which	have	been	concluded	by	 the	
most	 representative	 employers’	 and	 labour	 organisations	 at	 national	 level	 and	 which	 are	 applied	
throughout	national	 territory.53	However,	 in	 the	wake	of	 the	2008	 financial	 crisis,	 both	universally	
applicable	collective	agreements	and	general/sectoral	collective	bargaining	systems	have	been	pro-
gressively	dismantled	across	a	number	of	Member	States	as	a	direct	consequence	of	austerity	poli-
cies.54	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 collective	 agreements	which	 comply	with	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 PWD,	
posted	workers	are	only	entitled	to	whatever	statutory	minimum	wage	that	there	might	be	in	the	re-
ceiving	country.	This,	in	effect,	means	that	posted	workers	may	be	paid	substantially	less	than	local	
workers	for	the	same	work.	In	addition,	even	when	collective	agreements	are	applicable,	it	is	widely	
reported	 that	 sending	 companies	 tend	 to	pay	 the	 rates	applicable	 to	 the	 lowest	pay	group,	 rather	
than	the	adequate	pay	group	corresponding	to	workers’	job	tasks,	educational	level	and	seniority.55		
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
2004	when	Irish	Ferries,	a	company	operating	ferry	services	between	Ireland	and	France,	reflagged	one	of	its	vessels	to	
the	Bahamas	and	then	sought	to	replace	150	Irish	workers	with	agency	staff	who	were	to	be	paid	substantially	less	than	
the	Irish	minimum	wage.	Although	this	dispute	was	settled	in	early	2005	following	industrial	action,	Irish	Ferries	in	Sep-
tember	 2005	proposed	 to	 replace	 an	 additional	 543	 Irish	workers	with	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 European	 agency	workers	
posted	to	work	on	three	further	Cypriot-flagged	ships	from	Cyprus	in	order	to	circumvent	applicable	Irish	labour	law	and,	
in	particular,	the	minimum	wage	legislation.	For	a	detailed	overview	of	the	facts	see	T.	Krings,	‘Irish	Ferries,	Labour	Migra-
tion	and	the	Spectre	of	Displacement’	in	M.	Corcoran	and	P.	Share,	Belongings:	Shaping	Identity	in	Modern	Ireland	(Dub-
lin:	Institute	of	Public	Administration,	2008).		
50	All	figures	are	drawn	from	the	Commission’s	Impact	Assessment	accompanying	the	Proposal	for	a	Directive	amending	
the	PWD.	It	should	be	noted	that	strong	data	limitations	on	posting	of	workers	remain	an	on-going	problem.	There	have	
been	a	number	of	studies	which	have	sought	to	look	in	more	detail	at	the	problems	surrounding	the	interaction	between	
posting	and	temporary	work	and	this	is	not	discussed	in	more	detail	here.	See	further	Cremers,	In	search	of	cheap	labour	
in	Europe	and	A.	Van	Hoek	and	M.	Houwerzijl,	Comparative	Study	on	the	 legal	aspects	of	the	posting	of	workers	 in	the	
framework	of	the	provision	of	services	in	the	European	Union,	2011.	
51	European	Commission,	Impact	Assessment,	p.	13.	
52	PWD	Preamble,	para	14.	
53	Article	3(8)	PWD.		
54	 The	effect	 of	 the	 crisis	 on	national	 labour	 law	 systems	 is	 explained	by	 the	 ETUI	 in	 individual	 country	 reports	 here:	
https://www.etui.org/Publications2/Working-Papers/The-crisis-and-national-labour-law-reforms-a-mapping-exercise.	
See	also	A.	Koukiadaki,	I.	Tavora,	and	M.	Martinez-Lucio,	Joint	Regulation	and	Labour	Market	Policy	in	Europe	during	the	
Crisis,	ETUI,	Brussels,	2016.	
55	European	Commission,	Impact	Assessment.	
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Second,	 the	 composition	 of	 the	minimum	 rates	 of	 pay	 guaranteed	 to	 posted	workers	 in	 the	 host	
Member	States	is	unclear.	In	Sähköalojen	ammattiliitto	ry,	the	CJEU	only	clarified	selected	issues	of	
the	concept	of	‘minimum	rates	of	pay’.	Article	153	TFEU	expressly	excludes	pay	from	the	EU’s	com-
petence	and	the	definition	and	composition	of	‘minimum	rates	of	pay’	therefore	varies	enormously	
across	the	Member	States.	For	example,	certain	bonuses	or	allowances	(such	as	Christmas	bonus	or	
seniority	bonus)	are	constituent	parts	of	pay	in	some	Member	States	but	not	in	others.	The	absence	
of	a	clear	definition	of	the	constituent	elements	of	pay	results	in	legal	uncertainty	and	practical	diffi-
culties	for:	the	bodies	responsible	for	the	enforcement	of	the	rules	in	the	host	Member	State;	for	the	
service	provider	when	determining	the	wage	due	to	a	posted	worker;	and	for	the	awareness	of	post-
ed	workers	themselves	about	their	entitlements.	For	the	 latter,	access	to	knowledge	about	entitle-
ments	to	pay	is	rendered	even	more	difficult	by	the	fact	that	the	language,	laws	and	legal	system	of	a	
host	State	are	likely	to	be	foreign	to	posted	workers	who	can	also	be	left	without	effective	local	trade	
union	representation.		
Finally,	there	are	uncertainties	concerning	the	implementation	of	the	PWD	in	Denmark	and	Sweden	
who	lack	both	a	statutory	minimum	wage	and	a	scheme	for	the	extension	of	collective	agreements	in	
accordance	 with	 the	 Directive.	 In	 Sweden,	 the	 judgment	 in	 Laval	 continues	 to	 negatively	 impact	
trade	unions.	As	Woolfson	et	al.	point	out,	‘[b]y	circumscribing	the	right	of	national	trade	unions	to	
undertake	collective	action	to	enforce	domestic	terms	and	conditions	on	foreign	employers	sending	
workers	 to	 Sweden,	 the	 ECJ	 in	 Laval	 highlighted	 the	 soft	 underbelly	 of	 the	 Swedish	 model	 of	
autonomous	collective	bargaining	pay	formation.’56		As	a	result,	the	number	of	collective	agreements	
concluded	 with	 foreign	 employers	 has	 dropped	 significantly.57	 In	 the	 area	 of	 construction,	 the	
Swedish	trade	union	confederation,	LO,	produced	a	report	in	2010	which	examined	the	use	of	posted	
workers	 for	 three	 large	 infrastructure	 projects	 in	Malmö	 and	 Stockholm.58	 The	 report	 found	 that	
large	numbers	of	foreign	workers	(mainly	Polish)	were	posted	to	work	on	the	building	sites	by	Polish	
or	Irish	employment	agencies	at	wages	below	the	relevant	collective	agreements.	In	its	response,	LO	
called	 for	 increased	 regulation	 of	 posted	 work	 in	 Sweden	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 collective	
agreements	are	observed.59	A	Lex	Laval	which	was	passed	in	2010	permits	trade	unions	to	take	col-
lective	action	with	the	aim	of	regulating	the	employment	conditions	of	posted	workers	if	certain	cri-
teria	are	met:	first,	the	conditions	at	issue	must	correspond	to	generally	applicable	conditions	in	the	
relevant	sector;	 second,	 trade	union	demands	may	only	concern	minimum	pay	or	other	conditions	
contained	 in	 the	Directive;	and,	 third,	collective	action	 is	not	permitted	with	a	view	to	achieving	 ‘a	
Swedish	collective	agreement	 if	an	employer	can	show	that	 the	employees	are	already	 included	 in	
terms	and	conditions	(regardless	if	stipulated	by	collective	agreement,	employment	contract	or	man-
agerial	decision)	that	are	at	least	as	good	as	those	in	a	Swedish	central	branch	agreement.’60 Swedish	
trade	unions	complained	about	the	Lex	Laval	to	the	ILO	and	the	European	Committee	of	Social	Rights	
																																								 																				
56	 C.	Woolfson,	 J.	 Fudge	 and	 C.	 Thörnqvist,	 ‘Migrant	 precarity	 and	 future	 challenges	 to	 labour	 standards	 in	 Sweden’	
(2014)	35(4)	Economic	and	Industrial	Democracy	695,	p.	699.		
57	Ibid,	709.	
58	 C.-M.	 Jonsson,	 T.	 Pettersson,	 H.	 Löfgren	 and	 K.	 Arvidsson,	 När	 arbetskraftskostnaderna	 presser	 priset	 –	 en	 ge-
nomlysning	av	offentliga	investeringar	 i	 infrastruktur,	LO-rapporten,	Stockholm:	LO,	2010.	See	also	C.	Thörnqvist	and	S.	
Bernhardsson	(2015)	Their	own	stories	?	how	Polish	construction	workers	posted	to	Sweden	experience	their	job	situa-
tion,	or	resistance	versus	life	projects.	Transfer:	European	Review	of	Labour	and	Research,	21(1)	11.	
59	Ibid.,	34-7.	
60	Prop	2009/10:48.	
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who	both	upheld	the	complaints.61 There	is	a	widespread	recognition	that	the	legislation	has	severe	
shortcomings	yet	both	employer	associations	and	trade	unions	recognise	that	‘it	is	difficult	to	find	a	
model	that	is	compliant	with	the	Swedish	industrial	relations	model	and	the	Court’s	case	law.’62 Fol-
lowing	political	pressure,	a	further	parliamentary	governmental	inquiry	on	posting	of	workers	was	set	
up	in	September	2012	with	the	aim	of	evaluating	the	Lex	Laval.63	  
In	practical	 terms,	 the	PWD’s	differentiated	 rules	on	wages	clearly	 translate	 into	a	competitive	ad-
vantage	for	posting	companies	over	local	companies	in	host	countries.	According	to	Eurostat	data	for	
2014,	an	average	hour	of	work	costs	an	employer	€40	in	Denmark	and	€39	in	Belgium,	but	only	€3.80	
in	 Bulgaria,	 €4.60	 in	 Romania	 and	 €8.40	 in	 Poland.64	 Competitive	 advantages	 in	 relation	 to	wages	
particularly	affect	domestically-provided	services,	such	as	construction	and	personal	services;	given	
their	labour-intensive	and	price-sensitive	character	and	the	fact	that	delocalisation	of	these	activities	
is	 not	 possible.65	 However,	 there	 are	 also	 wide	 variations	 between	 sectors	 and	 countries.	 Posted	
workers	 are	 reported	 to	 receive	 a	 lower	 remuneration	 level	 than	 local	workers,	 especially	 in	high-
wage	 EU	 receiving	 countries,	 such	 as	 Belgium,	 Denmark,	 France,	 Germany,	 the	 Netherlands	 and	
Sweden.	Because	of	the	absence	of	data	on	the	earnings	of	posted	workers,	only	gross	estimates	ex-
ist.	However,	the	wage	gap	is	estimated	to	range	from	10-15%	in	the	Danish	construction	sector,	up	
to	about	25%	-	35%	in	the	construction	sector	in	the	Netherlands	and	Belgium,	and	up	to	50%	in	the	
road	transport	sector	in	Belgium.66	In	addition,	the	Commission	suggests67	that	wage	differentiation	
is	reported	to	be	especially	acute	in	two	cases.	First,	posted	workers	in	labour-intensive	sectors,	such	
as	 the	 construction	 sector	 and	 road	 transport	 are	more	 likely	 to	 receive	minimum	pay	 rates	 than	
posted	workers	in	high-end	service	sectors,	e.g.	finance	and	insurance.	This	is	because	in	these	sec-
tors	 labour	cost	differentials	are	one	of	the	key	drivers	of	posting	of	workers	while	posted	workers	
tend	to	have	low	skills.	By	contrast,	the	Commission’s	Impact	Assessment68	suggests	that	in	sectors	
or	for	professions	 in	which	posting	 is	driven	by	skills	shortages,	such	as	the	care	services	sector,	or	
when	workers	have	higher	skills,	wages	are	not	reported	to	be	a	problematic	issue.	Second,	unequal	
wage	treatment	particularly	affects	workers	posted	from	low-	to	high-wage	countries.	Although	the	
																																								 																				
61	See	Complaint	No.	85/2012	Swedish	Trade	Union	Confederation	(LO)	and	Swedish	Confederation	of	Professional	Em-
ployees	(TCO)	v.	Sweden,	12	July	2012	and	ECSR,	Decision	on	Admissibility	and	the	Merits	Complaint	No.	85/2012	Swe-
dish	Trade	Union	Confederation	(LO)	and	Swedish	Confederation	of	Professional	Employees	(TCO)	v.	Sweden,	3	July	2013.	
For	a	discussion	of	the	ECSR’s	decision	see	C.	Barnard,	‘More	Posting’	(2014)	43	Industrial	Law	Journal	194.	
62	D.	Schiek	et	al,	EU	Social	and	Labour	Rights	and	EU	Internal	Market	Law,	p.	66.	
63	See	Kommittédirektiv	Dir	2012:92.	This	Committee	reported	its	findings	on	26	October	2015.	See	Översyn	av	lex	Laval,	
SOU	 2015:83,	 available	 at	 http://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/d90af7051ee54a499950155582431922/oversyn-av-
lex-laval-sou-201583.	The	Committee	made	a	number	of	suggestions	for	reform	which	at	the	time	of	writing	were	passing	
through	the	Swedish	Parliamentary	process.	
64	http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Hourly_labour_costs.		
65	European	Commission,	Impact	Assessment,	p.	13.	
66	The	figures	in	this	paragraph	all	stem	from	the	Commission’s	Impact	Assessment.	See	ibid	note	1.	See	also	Fondazione	
Giacomo	Brodolini	(FGB),	Study	on	wage	setting	systems	and	minimum	rates	of	pay	applicable	to	posted	workers	in	ac-
cordance	with	Directive	96/71/EC	in	a	selected	number	of	Member	States	and	sectors,	Final	report,	November	2015;	D.	
Schiek	et	al,	EU	Social	and	Labour	Rights	and	EU	Internal	Market	Law:	Study	for	the	EMPL	Committee	(Brussels:	European	
Parliament,	2015);	and,	S.	Evju,	Cross-Border	Services,	Posting	of	Workers	and	Multilevel	Governance,	University	of	Oslo	
Skriftserie	193,	2013.		
67	European	Commission,	Impact	Assessment,	pp.	13-14.	
68	Ibid,	p.	14.	
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PWD	 does	 not	 preclude	 companies	 from	 applying	 more	 generous	 conditions	 than	 the	 minimum	
standards	of	 the	host	 country,	 it	 does	not	exert	 any	pressure	on	 companies	 to	do	 so	and	workers	
posted	from	low-wage	countries	tend	to	lack	the	bargaining	power	to	obtain	more	generous	condi-
tions	in	line	with	the	wage	standards	of	the	receiving	countries.	Within	the	host	Member	State	itself,	
the	PWD	therefore	has	the	potential	to	create	a	downward	spiral	of	wage	and	labour	cost	competi-
tion	which	may	have	a	negative	 impact	on	 local	workers	and	 risks	destabilising	 coordinated	wage-
setting	regimes	and	the	bargaining	autonomy	of	the	social	partners	in	those	countries.69	
The	rise	in	posted	work	points	to	the	PWD’s	success	in	fulfilling	its	first	objective:	the	promotion	of	
the	transnational	provision	of	services.	However,	the	lack	of	clarity	over	‘minimum	rates	of	pay’	and	
the	 absence	 of	 an	 equal	 treatment	 principle	 create	 conditions	which	 in	 certain	 sectors	 clearly	 fall	
short	of	and,	 indeed	mean	that	the	PWD	is	merely	paying	 lip	service	to	 its	second	and	third	objec-
tives:	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 climate	 of	 fair	 competition	 and	 the	 guarantee	 of	 respect	 for	 the	 rights	 of	
workers.	In	addition,	the	PWD	has	the	unintended	consequence	of	further	entrenching	existing	ine-
qualities	in	relation	to	skill	levels	and	gender. 
Skill	Levels	
The	PWD	is	sufficiently	broad	to	cover	a	whole	host	of	different	types	of	posting	(high	skilled	and	low	
skilled)	as	well	as	EU	and	non-EU	nationals.	However	the	fact	that	it	does	not	establish	a	strong	cata-
logue	of	rights	for	posted	workers,	and	does	not	differentiate	between	different	skill	levels	or	sectors	
means	that	posted	workers	 largely	have	to	rely	on	their	own	bargaining	power	 in	order	 to	achieve	
the	same	conditions	as	local	workers.	The	PWD	as	such	only	provides	a	minimum	floor	of	guaranteed	
rights.	This	has	the	effect	of	entrenching	existing	inequalities	on	the	grounds	of	skill	levels.		
The	phenomenon	of	posted	work	has	risen	exponentially	since	the	recent	EU	enlargements	and	while	
the	general	view	is	that	increased	free	movement	(whether	of	workers	or	under	the	umbrella	of	ser-
vices)	 has	 been	 positive,	 there	 is	 also	 evidence	 that	 there	 has	 been	 some	 downward	 pressure	 on	
wages	at	the	bottom	end	of	the	scale,	particularly	in	low-skilled	sectors.70	Although	official	statistics	
do	not	contain	information	about	skill	levels,	the	main	sectors	which	have	been	particularly	affected	
by	this	increase	in	posted	workers	–	construction	and	manufacturing	–	are	those	which	have	a	high	
proportion	of	low-skilled	labour.	The	European	Builders	Confederation	(EBC)	estimates	that,	between	
2011	and	2014,	close	to	15,000	(over	8%)	of	workers	in	the	construction	sector	in	Belgium	lost	their	
job	 ‘due	to	unfair	competition	showed	by	a	constant	 increase	of	posted	workers.’	According	to	the	
EBC,	figures	from	the	French	construction	sector	are	similar.71	It	is	the	very	nature	of	low-skilled	work	
that	 workers	 are	 easy	 to	 replace	 and	 lack	 sufficient	 bargaining	 power	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 equal	
treatment	with	 local	workers.	 In	 addition,	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 of	 language,	 local	 laws,	 customs	 and	
wage-setting	practices	 in	 low-skilled	 sectors	means	 that	 these	posted	workers	 are	particularly	 vul-
nerable	to	inequality	of	treatment.	It	is	in	these	sectors	that	there	is	the	greatest	disparity	in	wages	
between	 local	 and	 posted	 workers.	 The	 same	 is	 not	 true	 for	 highly-skilled	 posted	 workers	 where	
																																								 																				
69	See	N.	Lillie	and	I.	Wagner,	Subcontracting,	insecurity	and	posted	work:	evidence	from	construction,	meat	processing	
and	ship	building,	ETUI,	2015.		
70	For	evidence	of	this	in	the	UK	see	M.	Sumption	and	W.	Somerville,	The	UK's	New	Europeans:	Progress	and	Challenges	
Five	Years	After	Accession,	Equality	and	Human	Rights	Commission	Policy	Report,	together	with	the	Migration	Policy	Insti-
tute,	January	2010.	
71	Dhéret	and	Ghimis,	‘The	revision	of	the	Posted	Workers	Directive’,	p.	7	and	European	Builders	Confederation,	‘Posting	
of	workers:	European	small	construction	entrepreneurs	welcome	revision’,	2016.	
CETLS	ONLINE	PAPER	SERIES,	VOLUME	5	(1)		 2016	
	
-	12	-	
there	is	virtually	no	evidence	of	the	posted	workers	being	treated	differently	to	local	workers.72	The	
PWD	therefore	contributes	to	the	phenomenon	of	widening	income	inequality	across	the	EU73	and	its	
potential	to	allow	unequal	treatment	on	the	grounds	of	pay	entrenches	inequality	on	the	basis	of	skill	
levels.	
Gender	
There	is	a	lack	of	reliable	data	on	the	gender	composition	of	posted	workers	however	one	can	make	
a	number	of	general	comments	about	gender-related	aspects	of	the	Directive.	The	Directive	does	not	
mention	gender	and	appears	gender	neutral.	 It	 therefore	seeks	to	provide	for	 ‘formal’	equality	be-
tween	men	and	women.74	However,	the	very	nature	of	posted	work	means	that	it	is	inherently	dis-
advantageous	 to	women	 especially	 as	 it	 is	 still	 the	 case	 that	 in	most	 societies	women	have	main-
tained	primary	 care	 responsibilities.75	As	 such,	 in	appearing	gender	neutral,	 the	PWD	does	 little	 to	
encourage	‘substantive’	equality.76		
A	large	part	of	posted	work	occurs	in	the	construction	sector:	a	male-dominated	industry	with	very	
high	 labour	costs.77	Posting	here	 is	particularly	profitable	as	 it	allows	employers	 to	dramatically	 re-
duce	labour	costs.	It	is	therefore	not	surprising	that	the	majority	of	postings	occur	in	this	sector.	The	
Commission	however	suggests	that	widespread	unfair	treatment	on	grounds	of	wages	is	not	an	issue	
in	areas	where	posting	 is	driven	mainly	by	 skills	 shortages	 rather	 than	competition	on	 the	basis	of	
pay.	The	care	sector	–	largely	female-dominated	stands	out	here.	However,	care	work	by	its	very	na-
ture	tends	to	be	low-paid78	so	there	is	limited	scope	for	competition	on	grounds	of	pay	and	therefore	
there	is	admittedly	little	unequal	treatment	here	between	posted	and	local	workers.79	However,	this	
																																								 																				
72	European	Commission,	Impact	Assessment,	p.	14.		
73	Ibid,	p.	13.	
74	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	examine	the	differing	theories	which	justify	discrimination	legislation.	An	over-
view	of	this	can	be	found	in	S.	Fredman,	Discrimination	Law,	Oxford:	OUP,	2
nd
	edition	2011,	chapter	1	and	N.	Bamforth,	
‘Conceptions	of	Anti-Discrimination	Law’	(2004)	24	OJLS	693.	For	EU	Anti-Discrimination	law	see	D.	Schiek,	‘From	Europe-
an	Union	non-discrimination	law	towards	multidimensional	Equality	Law	for	Europe’,	European	Union	Non-Discrimination	
Law:	Comparative	Perspectives	on	Multidimensional	Equality	Law,	(D.	Schiek	&	V	Chege	eds,	New	York	et	al:	Routledge-
Cavendish,	2009)3-27.	
75	See	OECD,	Closing	the	Gender	Gap:	Act	Now,	OECD	Publishing,	2012,	pp.	199	ff	and	W.	Patton,	Conceptualising	Wom-
en’s	Working	Lives:	Moving	the	Boundaries	of	Discourse,	Sense	Publishers,	2013,	pp.	5	-6.		
76	See	further	L.	Jacobs,	Pursuing	Equal	Opportunities,	CUP,	2004,	chapter	5	and	S.	Fredman,	Women	and	the	Law,	OUP,	
1997,	chapters	1	and	4.	
77	 For	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 average	 costs	 see:	 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Hourly_labour_costs.		
78	The	feminisation	of	care	is	not	restricted	to	the	family	sphere,	but	has	also	been	reflected	in	paid	care	work.		As	the	
sector	has	grown,	women	have	 formed	an	ever	 larger	majority	of	paid	care	workers.	See	 further	M.	Daly	and	K.	Rake,	
Gender	and	the	Welfare	State:	care,	work	and	welfare	in	Europe	and	in	the	USA,	Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2003.	In	keeping	
with	the	low	value	assigned	to	caregiving	in	the	private	sphere,	this	sector	is	characterised	by	low	pay	and	poor	working	
conditions,	devaluing	the	value	of	care	in	economic	and	employment	terms.	As	the	Migration	Observatory	points	out,	in	
the	UK,	social	care,	which	includes	a	range	of	care-related	occupations,	e.g.	care	assistants	in	residential	care	homes	and	
in	home	care	services,	is	one	of	the	lowest	paid	sectors	of	the	labour	market.	The	sector	has	historically	been	reliant	on	
women,	who	have	combined	low	paid	part-time	work	in	social	care	with	unpaid	caring	responsibilities	for	families.	Alt-
hough	the	introduction	of	the	National	Minimum	Wage	in	1999	brought	about	an	increase	in	average	pay	levels	for	social	
care	workers,	particularly	in	care	homes,	most	pay	has	since	stayed	on	or	near	the	National	Minimum	Wage.	See	further	
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/policy-primers/social-care-older-people-and-demand-migrant-workers.	
79	 For	 references	 see	 http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/policy-primers/social-care-older-people-and-demand-
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then	 raises	broader	questions	over	 the	value	of	 care	work	vis-à-vis	 comparable	 low-skilled	work	 in	
male-dominated	sectors	such	as	construction.80	
The	newest	proposal	–	a	rebalancing	of	objectives?	
On	8	March	2016,	the	European	Commission	issued	a	set	of	proposals	as	part	of	its	mobility	package	
which	included	a	proposal	for	a	Directive	amending	the	PWD.	The	proposed	Directive	is	to	comple-
ment	 the	 Enforcement	 Directive	 rather	 than	 to	 replace	 it.	 The	 proposed	 Directive	 replicates	 the	
PWD’s	objectives	and	aims	 to	 facilitate	 the	provision	of	services	across	borders	within	a	climate	of	
fair	competition	while	ensuring	respect	for	the	rights	of	posted	workers.81	It	has	the	same	legal	base	
as	the	PWD	–	firmly	locating	the	regulation	of	posted	work	within	the	free	movement	of	services	–	
focuses	on	three	main	areas:	rules	on	temporary	work	agencies82;	rules	applying	to	long-term	post-
ing83;	 and,	 the	 remuneration	 of	 posted	workers	where	 it	 introduces	 the	 principle	 of	 equal	 pay	 for	
equal	work.	
In	terms	of	pay,	the	Commission	proposal	replaces	the	reference	to	‘minimum	rates	of	pay’	in	article	
3(1)	of	the	PWD	with	the	term	‘remuneration’	and	imposes	an	obligation	on	Member	States	to	pub-
lish	 information	 on	 the	 constituent	 elements	 of	 remuneration.	 This	 would	 mean	 that	 employers	
would	have	to	apply	the	rules	of	the	host	country	in	relation	to	pay/remuneration,	as	laid	down	by	
law	or	by	universally	applicable	collective	agreements,	and	not	just	the	minimum	rates	of	pay.	In	ad-
dition,	rules	set	by	universally	applicable	collective	agreements	will	become	mandatory	in	all	sectors,	
whereas	previously	they	were	only	mandatory	in	the	construction	sector.	This	amendment	builds	on	
the	case	law	of	the	CJEU	in	Sähköalojen	ammattiliitto	ry	by	entitling	posted	workers	to	some	of	the	
same	advantages	such	as	bonuses,	or	pay	increases	according	to	seniority	as	local	workers.	The	new	
proposal	also	extends	the	equal	treatment	principle	to	posted	temporary	agency	workers	vis-à-vis	lo-
cal	temporary	agency	workers	with	respect	to	remuneration	and	working	conditions.	
The	Commission’s	proposal	has	already	caused	controversy.	The	ETUC	considers	the	proposal	a	sig-
nificant	improvement	but	argues	that	it	will	result	in	a	right	‘to	equal	pay	that	many	posted	workers	
will	never	get.’84	The	proposal	is	certainly	a	step	in	the	right	direction	in	that	it	recognises	a	problem	
with	 the	current	definition	of	 ‘minimum	rates	of	pay’	and	 the	way	 in	which	 these	are	determined.	
The	use	of	the	term	‘remuneration’	allows	for	the	inclusion	of	a	variety	of	different	elements	as	part	
of	a	pay	package	and	gives	social	partners	some	discretion	in	bargaining	over	pay	and	its	constituent	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
migrant-workers.	There	have	however	been	incidences	of	unequal	treatment	in	relation	to	terms	and	conditions	of	work	
(not	pay).	For	examples	 see	Ver.di,	Migrantinnen	 in	Privathaushalten,	2014	and	F.	Colombo,	A.	 Llena-Nozal,	 J.	Mercier	
and	F.	Tjadens,	Help	Wanted?	Providing	and	Paying	for	Long-Term	Care,	OECD	Health	and	Policy	Studies,	2011.	
80	The	concept	of	equal	pay	 for	work	of	equal	value	 is	enshrined	 in	EU	 law.	See	the	Recast	Equal	Treatment	Directive	
2006/54	which	consolidated	inter	alia	previous	directives	on	equal	treatment	and	equal	pay,	and	incorporated	principles	
derived	from	CJEU	case	law.	See	also	Case	C-127/92	Enderby	v	Frenchay	Health	Authority	[1993]	ECR	I-5535	and	Case	C-
381/99	Susanna	Brunnhofer	v	Bank	der	österreichischen	Postsparkasse	AG	[2001]	ECR	I-04961.	
81	http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=471&newsId=2488&furtherNews=yes.		
82	The	proposal	introduces	the	principle	of	equal	treatment	between	posted	and	local	temporary	agency	workers.	
83	The	proposal	aligns	the	definition	of	a	posting	period	(24	months)	with	that	of	the	relevant	social	security	provisions.	
The	current	PWD	does	not	define	when	a	posting	ceases	to	be	‘temporary’.	Under	the	Commission’s	proposal,	long-term	
posted	workers	will	be	covered	by	the	mandatory	rules	of	the	host	country’s	labour	law	system	following	a	period	of	24	
months	of	posting.	
84	https://www.etuc.org/press/posted-workers-revision-%E2%80%93-equal-pay-some#.V3PVEaIYF2A.		
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parts.	As	Novitz	points	out,	‘this	would	enable	the	PWD	to	reflect	the	more	dynamic	wage-setting	re-
alities	 in	 the	 contemporary	 labour	 market.’85	 The	 proposal	 also	 makes	 provision	 for	 mandatory	
standards	to	be	set	for	posted	workers	 in	all	sectors	by	collective	agreements	which	have	been	de-
clared	universally	applicable	(currently	this	only	applies	to	the	construction	sector).	However,	in	prac-
tice	 this	 is	 likely	 to	have	 limited	 effect.86	 In	 addition,	 the	proposed	Directive	only	 recognises	wage	
setting	through	universally	applicable	collective	agreements	or	legislation.	There	is	no	recognition	of	
the	role	played	by	sectoral	or	company-level	agreements.	As	such,	the	proposed	Directive	does	little	
to	tackle	inequality	in	those	countries,	such	as	Germany	or	Italy	which	have	no,	or	make	limited	use	
of,	 universally	 applicable	 or	 generally	 applicable	 collective	 agreements	 but	 rely	 instead	 on	 other	
forms	 of	 agreements.	 Posted	workers	working	 in	 sectors	with	 universally	 binding	 collective	 agree-
ments	will	therefore	receive	a	higher	level	of	protection	than	posted	workers	active	in	less	regulated	
sectors.	 This	not	only	 creates	 inequality	of	 treatment	between	different	 groups	of	posted	workers	
but	also	 raises	a	gender-dimension	 in	 that	 sectors	 such	as	 the	construction	 sector	which	are	 tradi-
tional	trade	union	strongholds	have	been	more	successful	than	others87,	such	as	the	care	sector,	 in	
developing	transnational	regulation	of	working	conditions.	Such	 issues	could	be	better	dealt	with	 if	
there	was	better	collection	of	data	on	posted	workers,	their	characteristics	and	skill	levels.	However,	
although	 the	 European	Commission	 recognised	 the	unreliability	 of	 existing	 data	 on	posted	work88,	
the	proposed	Directive	 fails	 to	establish	a	more	reliable	system	for	 the	collection	of	data.	The	pro-
posed	Directive	has	also	been	criticised	for	neither	introducing	a	right	for	trade	unions	to	bargain	on	
behalf	of	posted	workers	nor	does	it	address	concerns	over	joint	liability	of	sub-contractors	and	main	
contractors	 for	 respect	 of	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	 employment.89	 Finally,	 the	 proposed	 Directive	
does	not	address	the	two	central	concerns	raised	in	the	wake	of	the	Laval	case:	first,	that	the	PWD	
sets	out	a	ceiling	of	protection	(rather	than	a	floor	of	rights);	and,	second,	that	collective	action	taken	
by	trade	unions	to	enforce	posted	workers’	rights	to	better	treatment	must	be	proportionate.			
The	response	to	the	proposed	Directive	by	national	parliaments	shows	diverging	 interests	between	
Member	States.90	Whereas	the	French	parliament	criticised	the	proposal	for	not	providing	sufficient	
protection	for	equality	of	treatment	of	posted	workers,	parliaments	from	Central	and	Eastern	Euro-
pean	Member	States	objected	to	the	proposal	on	the	grounds	that	a	right	to	equal	pay	would	harm	
competitiveness.	As	of	10	May	2016,	fourteen	chambers	from	eleven	Member	States	(ten	from	Cen-
tral	and	Eastern	Europe,	and	Denmark)	had	made	use	of	the	Subsidiarity	Control	Mechanism	to	raise	
subsidiarity	 concerns	 and	 thereby	 triggered	 a	 ‘yellow	 card’91.	 In	 addition,	 six	 national	 parliaments	
(Spain,	Italy	(both	the	Camera	dei	Deputati	and	the	Senate),	Portugal,	the	UK	and	France)	sent	opin-
																																								 																				
85	T.	Novitz,	‘The	Scope	for	Collective	Bargaining	in	Posting	and	Procurement––What	Might	Come	From	Recent	Court	of	
Justice	 Case	 Law	 and	 the	 Proposed	 Reform	 of	 the	 Posting	 of	 Workers	 Directive?’	 April	 6	 2016	 available	 at	
http://legalresearch.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2016/04/the-scope-for-collective-bargaining-in-posting-and-procurement/.		
86	The	Commission	anticipates	that	it	will	only	have	an	effect	in	a	limited	number	of	Member	States	including	Ireland	and	
Luxembourg.	See	European	Commission,	Impact	Assessment,	p.	24.	
87	Dhéret	and	Ghimis,	‘The	revision	of	the	Posted	Workers	Directive’,	p.	10.	
88	European	Commission,	Impact	Assessment.		
89	https://www.etuc.org/press/posted-workers-revision-%E2%80%93-equal-pay-some#.V3PVEaIYF2A.		
90	 Individual	 Member	 State	 opinions	 are	 available	 here:	
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm		
91	 See	 http://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/national-parliaments-invoke-yellow-card-in-response-
to-revised-posted-workers-directive/.This	is	only	the	third	time	that	such	a	procedure	has	been	triggered.		
CETLS	ONLINE	PAPER	SERIES,	VOLUME	5	(1)		 2016	
	
-	15	-	
ions	 considering	 the	proposal	 as	 compatible	with	 the	principle	 of	 subsidiarity.	 Central	 and	 Eastern	
European	countries	had	already	opposed	a	review	of	the	PWD	prior	to	the	publication	of	the	current	
proposal	on	the	basis	that	the	principle	of	equal	pay	for	equal	work	in	the	same	place	may	be	incom-
patible	with	the	single	market,	as	pay	rate	differences	constitute	one	legitimate	element	of	competi-
tive	advantage	for	service	providers.	In	responding	to	the	subsidiarity	control	mechanism,	the	Social-
ists	and	Democrats	Group	in	the	European	Parliament	issued	support	for	the	proposed	Directive	and	
rejected	national	 parliaments’	 concerns.92	On	20	 July	 2016,	 the	 European	Commission	published	 a	
Communication93	which	concluded	that	the	proposed	revision	of	the	PWD	did	not	breach	the	subsid-
iarity	principle.	 The	Commissioner	 for	Employment,	 Social	Affairs,	 Skills	 and	Labour	Mobility,	Mari-
anne	Thyssen	also	reiterated	that	‘[p]osting	of	workers	is	a	cross-border	issue	by	nature.	The	Juncker	
Commission	remains	firmly	committed	to	the	free	movement	of	people	on	the	basis	of	rules	that	are	
clear,	 fair	 for	 everybody	 and	 enforced	 on	 the	 ground.’94	 The	 renewed	 emphasis	 on	 protection	 of	
workers’	rights	and	fair	competition	was	confirmed	by	Jean-Claude	Juncker	in	his	State	of	the	Union	
address	on	14	September	2016	where	he	stated	that	‘workers	should	get	the	same	pay	for	the	same	
work	in	the	same	place.	Europe	is	not	the	Wild	West,	but	a	social	market	economy.’95		
The	use	of	the	Subsidiarity	Control	Mechanism	in	this	case	(and	predominantly	by	one	regional	bloc)	
highlights	serious	divisions	across	Europe	and	is	indicative	of	the	tensions	between	economic	and	so-
cial	rights	which	came	to	the	fore	in	the	Laval	case.	On	3	July	2016,	the	French	Prime	Minister,	Ma-
nuel	Valls,	threatened	to	stop	applying	the	PWD	unless	the	revised	Directive	is	adopted.96	For	home	
Member	States,	especially	those	from	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	the	‘process	of	[relocation	by	en-
terprises],	and	that	of	the	related	migration	of	some	of	their	workers	to	the	old	Member	States,	are	
the	means	by	which	convergence	on	Western	European	levels	of	productivity	and	per	capita	income	
are	achieved.’97	However,	 in	 light	of	current	EU	 labour	market	conditions,	 including	wage	differen-
tials	and	diversity	of	wage-setting	 regimes,	 in	 the	context	of	an	enlarged	European	Union,	 the	bal-
ance	struck	by	the	PWD	to	establish	a	climate	of	fair	competition	and	protect	workers’	rights	while	
also	promoting	 the	 transnational	provision	of	 services	 has	 changed	considerably.	 Following	 the	 re-
cent	European	enlargements,	the	ratio	of	highest	to	lowest	national	median	wages	across	the	EU	has	
increased	considerably	and	there	are	certainly	valid	suggestions	that	the	way	in	which	people	move	
across	the	EU	has	changed.	There	has	been	a	shift	from	the	regular	freedom	of	workers	to	move	to	
another	 member	 state	 towards	 other	 mobility	 channels	 such	 as	 posting	 and/or	 (bogus)	 self-
employment.98	According	to	Cremers,	‘posting	has	become	one	of	the	channels	for	the	cross-border	
recruitment	of	“cheap”	 labour	without	 reference	 to	 the	rights	 that	can	be	derived	 from	EU	 law	on	
genuine	labour	mobility.’99	Instead,	under	the	current	system	of	regulation	‘posted	workers	may	un-
																																								 																				
92	http://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/3rd-yellow-card-V.Kreilinger.pdf.		
93	Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	Council	and	the	National	Parliaments		
	on	the	proposal	for	a	Directive	amending	the	Posting	of	Workers	Directive,	with	regard	to	the	principle	of	subsidiarity,	in	
accordance	with	Protocol	No	2	COM(2016)	55	final.	
94	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2546_en.htm.		
95	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3042_en.htm.		
96	The	Economist,	Going	posted,	9
th
	July	2016.	
97	N.	Adnett	and	S.	Hardy,	The	European	Social	Model	–	Modernisation	or	Evolution?,	Elgar,	Cheltenham,	2005,	p.	201.	
98	Dhéret	and	Ghimis,	‘The	revision	of	the	Posted	Workers	Directive’,	p.	4.	
99	J.	Cremers,	‘Economic	freedoms	and	labour	standards	in	the	European	Union’	(2016)	22(2)	Transfer	149,	p.	157.	
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dercut	the	minimum	conditions	established	by	the	host	country’s	law	or	negotiated	under	generally	
applicable	collective	agreements	and	undermine	the	organization	and	functioning	of	local	or	sectoral	
labour	 markets.’100	 However,	 if	 posting	 of	 workers	 is	 to	 become	 a	 genuinely	 alternative	 mobility	
channel	to	the	free	movement	of	workers,	then	it	must	be	subject	to	proper	regulation,	monitoring	
and	enforcement.	In	its	current	form,	the	PWD	is	not,	in	many	cases,	able	to	adequately	fulfil	its	own	
objectives.	 For	host	Member	States,	 the	absence	of	 an	equal	pay	principle	and	 lack	of	 clarity	over	
minimum	 rates	of	 pay	 lead	 to	 ‘a	 concentration	of	 posted	workers	 in	 the	 lower	 echelons	of	 labour	
markets	[which]	bears	the	risk	of	an	erosion	of	labour	standards	and	evasion	of	mandatory	rules.	This	
type	of	regime	shopping	leads	to	serious	risks,	such	as	the	distortion	of	competition	and	a	downward	
pressure	on	pay’101;	which	go	directly	against	the	PWD’s	objectives.	The	Commission’s	proposals	for	
a	revision	of	the	PWD	go	some	way	towards	alleviating	some	of	these	concerns	and	rebalancing	the	
objectives	of	the	Directive.	However,	it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	proposals	will	be	adopted	in	
the	face	of	substantial	opposition	from	a	number	of	Member	States.	
Conclusion	
The	phenomenon	of	posted	work	is	on	the	rise	across	the	EU	and	is	part	of	a	broader	trend	whereby	
workers	are	increasingly	making	use	of	different	mobility	channels	in	order	to	move	from	one	Mem-
ber	 State	 to	 another.	 The	PWD	aims	 to	promote	 the	 transnational	 provision	of	 services	while	 also	
providing	a	climate	of	fair	competition	and	ensuring	respect	for	the	rights	of	workers.	The	balancing	
of	 these	objectives	has	 led	 to	 tensions	which	culminated	 in	 the	CJEU’s	decision	 in	Laval	where	 the	
Court	firmly	tilted	the	balance	towards	the	protection	of	the	transnational	provision	of	services,	and	
away	 from	concerns	 for	 the	 rights	of	 (posted)	workers.	Twenty	years	after	 its	adoption,	and	 in	 the	
context	of	an	enlarged	European	Union,	it	is	clear	that	the	PWD	is	no	longer	able	to	adequately	fulfil	
its	objectives.	The	 lack	of	 clarity	on	 the	definition	of	minimum	rates	of	pay	and	 the	absence	of	an	
equal	 treatment	 principle	 –	 inherent	 in	 the	 free	movement	 of	workers	 but	 not	 granted	 to	 posted	
workers	who	are	regulated	under	the	umbrella	of	free	movement	of	services	–	has	led	to	differenti-
ated	 rules	 on	wages	 across	Member	 States.	 In	 effect,	 the	 PWD’s	 provisions,	 as	 interpreted	 by	 the	
CJEU,	give	posting	companies	a	competitive	advantage	over	companies	in	host	Member	States	which	
goes	beyond	‘fair	competition’.	This	may	lead	to	a	downward	spiral	of	wage	and	labour	cost	competi-
tion	which	has	a	negative	 impact	on	 local	workers	and	risks	destabilising	coordinated	wage-setting	
regimes.	Equally,	the	PWD	fails	to	protect	those	workers’	rights	which	it	has	set	out	as	essential	with-
in	 its	provisions.	Attempts	 to	amend	 the	PWD	have	hitherto	been	unsuccessful.	 The	Commission’s	
most	recent	proposal	is	certainly	a	step	in	the	right	direction	however	it	is	limited	in	its	potential	due	
to	the	legal	base.	Diverging	interests	as	evidenced	by	the	Subsidiarity	Control	Mechanism	may	put	an	
end	to	the	newest	proposal,	yet	that	will	not	resolve	the	tensions	which	the	PWD	in	its	current	form	
exacerbates.			
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